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In recent years, the problem of selecting judges to sit on the
highest state courts has become a national crisis. North Carolina
remains among the states whose constitutions require competitive
elections of all its judges. Presently, all candidates for its judicial
offices must first compete for election in a non-partisan primary, a
system motivated by the desire to maximize the power of the state's
citizen-voters to choose their judges and hold them accountable for
their fidelity to the law.' Some observers have continued to celebrate
such judicial elections as an honorable democratic empowerment,2
while others have not.3 The disagreement has continued for almost
two centuries, but has encountered new impediments over the last
half century and especially in the last decade, largely as a result of
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States extending the
meaning and application of the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States far beyond the expectations of those who wrote
or ratified it, or many who have since proclaimed its virtue and
importance.
There are four enduring problems with electing judges. These are
(1) candidates' campaign promises, which may, if they are elected,
impair their independence to make future decisions on the law and
1. In a non-partisan primary, the top two vote-getters move on to the general
election, regardless of political affiliation. Such a primary is required when the number of
candidates is more than double the number of the available seats. In 1996, the General
Assembly enacted a law requiring superior court judges to be elected in this way. Act of
Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 7-20, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 541-44 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-321 (2009)). In 2001, similar legislation was passed for
district court judges. Act of Sept. 6, 2001, ch. 403, sec. 1, § 163-321, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws
1548, 1548 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-321 (2009)). And in 2002, the
same was passed for the state supreme court and court of appeals. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch.
158, sec. 7, § 163-321, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 626 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-321 (2009)); see History of Reform Efforts: North Carohna, Formal Changes
Since Inception, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
selection/reform efforts/formal changes since inception.cfm?state=NC (last visited Aug. 25,
2011). On earlier reforms, see James C. Drennan, Judicial Reform in North Carolina, in
JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 19, 19-24 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds.,
1993).
2. E.g., Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, FEDERALIST
SOCIETY (Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-case-for-partisan-
judicial-elections (arguing that judicial elections are preferable to other methods of
choosing judges).
3. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726-29 (1995); Margaret H. Marshall, Threats to the
Rule of Law: State Courts, Public Expectations and Political Attitudes, DAEDALUS, Fall
2008, at 122, 126-27.
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the evidence presented by the parties; (2) other actions by candidates
and their supporters who raise funds for campaign advertising may
resemble or constitute corruption; (3) voter inattention and
disinformation may result in poor popular choices; and (4)
candidates' opportunity and temptation to engage in unwarranted
degradation of rival candidates may diminish respect for prevailing
candidates and thus for the law they administer. All four problems
have been magnified by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States extending the application of the First Amendment of the
Constitution to empower candidates seeking election to judicial
offices, without regard for constraints imposed by state law:
(1) to disparage rival candidates;'
(2) to promise specific decisions in future cases;' and
(3) to seek and accept campaign contributions from litigants in
pending or future cases, including even from immortal business
corporations not entitled to vote but who have stakes in legal
questions that the elected judges might some day be required
to decide.'
The Court has also disabled state governments from limiting the
expenditures of a candidate's own personal funds if one should
choose to buy the office with advertising, as some candidates in other
states have.' And the Court has also now prohibited states from
discouraging large campaign contributions to, or expenditures of,
judicial candidates by protecting their rivals with matching funds.
The gravity of the perils to judicial independence created by
these Supreme Court activist extensions of the First Amendment has
been exhibited in many states. In no state has the effort to meet the
challenge to its system of selecting judges been more vigorous than in
North Carolina. The device of the non-partisan primary, introduced
in North Carolina in 1996, alleviates none of these problems,9 but
some had been reduced by the scheme of public funding, introduced
six years later in 2002.1o This Article provides an account of that effort
4. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 264,270-71 (1964).
5. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002).
6. SecCitizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
7. SeeDavis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 740-41 (2008).
8. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813
(2011).
9. Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, sec. 7, § 163-322, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess.
536, 541 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-322 (2009)).
10. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 9, sec. 1, § 163-278.61, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 616
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2009)).
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and of a reform currently advanced by the North Carolina Bar
Association that is responsive to the excesses of the Supreme Court.
This Article will trace the history of judicial elections, both in North
Carolina and around the nation, in order to better analyze the current
system in North Carolina.
Part I focuses on the nineteenth century development of state
judicial elections as a means to solve corruption and create judicial
independence, specifically highlighting the developments in North
Carolina. Part II discusses the progressive reforms of judicial
elections that occurred in some, but not all, states during the
twentieth century. Part III discusses the enduring problems of judicial
elections and how those problems have been magnified by national
politics and Supreme Court rulings during the past half-century. Part
IV reviews North Carolina's legislation, which attempts to ensure
independence in a system of judicial elections. Lastly, Part V
discusses the problems that are left unaddressed by the North
Carolina legislation and proposes additional reform. The Article
concludes that reasonable citizens of North Carolina have no choice
but to recognize that the Court's "activist" decisions have rendered
unworkable the provisions of their state constitution governing the
election of judges, even while demonstrating the case for a political
system holding high court judges accountable for their political
decisions.
I. THE ENIGMA OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN A DEMOCRACY
The central issue in these matters is judicial independence that is
indispensable to the integrity of law but also a potential source of
abuse. In 1912, President William Howard Taft, while campaigning
for re-election, proclaimed that he loved judges and loved courts.
"They are my ideals," he said, "that typify on earth what we shall
meet hereafter in heaven under a just God."" Alas, would that it
were so! Judges of all ranks and jurisdictions are afflicted with the
usual array of human failings.12 Even the best and most professional
judges, who carefully read and faithfully enforce legal texts, are
11. Jeffrey B. Morris, What Heaven Must Be Like: William Howard Taft as Chief
Justice, 1921-1930, 1983 SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y Y.B. 80, 80. For the speech that President
Taft delivered on judicial administration, see generally William H. Taft, The Delays of the
Law, Address Before the Virginia Bar Association (Aug. 6, 1908), in 18 YALE L.J. 28
(1908) (discussing "the delays and inequalities in the administration ofjustice").
12. For an account of the many human failings of judges, see Paul D. Carrington &
Roger C. Cramton, Orginal Sin and Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability for
Justices, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1120-21 (2009).
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inevitably influenced by the moral and political values they bring to
the task and by their emotional conditions, including those underlying
their moral and political values. And even the best judges are not
immune to self-centered concerns for their professional reputations,
personal effectiveness in influencing public affairs, continued
employment, or possible promotion to a higher office." Indeed, it has
been aptly said that jurors are the only public officials lacking
ambition.
We hope that our judges will suppress consideration of such
personal interests. But somewhat inconsistently, we all prefer that our
judges bring our own shared values to the tasks of interpreting and
enforcing legal texts. Given the human failings that our judges share
with the rest of us, the conflicting values that shape their and our
understandings of what legal texts mean, and also given the large
political role acquired by high courts in the American constitutional
scheme, the selection of judges is an extraordinarily sensitive task for
which no very good method has yet been found. Indeed, this author
once heard an eminent jurist from a western state proclaim "there is
no way to pick judges that is worth a Goddamn."
The Founders who drafted the eighteenth century state and
federal constitutions reflected only briefly on the problem of judicial
independence and integrity. For the federal judiciary, they simply
agreed to a system resembling that established by the English
Parliament for the judges selected by the Crown who sat in the
common law courts.14 The Founders preferred the eighteenth century
model English judge to their colonial judges selected by the Privy
Council, who had served at its pleasure. Many of the colonial judges
had been dutifully hostile to the War for Independence and had fled
the country when that war was over. As a group, they were so
mistrusted by the revolutionaries as to be the subject of protest in the
13. For recent reflections on the self-indulgence of Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States, see generally DAVID R. Dow, AMERICA'S PROPHETS: How JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM MAKES AMERICA GREAT (2009); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009); ROBERT
F. NAGEL, UNRESTRAINED: JUDICIAL EXCESS AND THE MIND OF THE AMERICAN
LAWYER (2008); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (2008). Frank Cross provides a formidable empirical
demonstration that "U]udicial decision making clearly involves a mix that includes some
ideological influence, considerable legal influence, and undoubtedly other factors."
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 177 (2007).
14. See, e.g., Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.). For an account of its
role in England, see generally I. Namani Tarkow, The Significance of the Act of Settlement
in the Evolution ofEnglish Democracy, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 537 (1943) (tracing the influence of
the Act of Settlement throughout history and the courts).
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Declaration of Independence." The roles of federal judges would be
narrowly confined, and so they could be selected by the President and
confirmed by the Senate (in lieu of appointment by the King) and,
like common law judges, would hold office "during good
[b]ehaviour."'I
Imperfections in this federal scheme were almost immediately
exposed. Two of President Washington's appointments, Judge John
Pickering and Justice Samuel Chase, were appointed as a favor to
their senators. In each case, the senator's nomination was made to
win the approval of fellow citizens who wished to be rid of the judge
in question. Citizens of New Hampshire wished to be relieved of the
services of the alcoholic Judge Pickering." And, citizens of Maryland
wished to be relieved of the services of Justice Chase, who was widely
regarded as corrupt." The House of Representatives later impeached
both; Pickering was removed from the federal bench," but Chase
narrowly survived removal.20
Meanwhile, John Marshall invented the novel "opinion of the
Court" to replace the individual oral responses of judges to
arguments, which had been the practice of the common law judges on
whom the federal officers were modeled.2' The signed opinion of the
court, especially when employed to resolve detected ambiguities in
constitutional texts, was a lawmaking device that transformed the
political role not only of the Supreme Court of the United States, but
15. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) ("He has made
Judges dependent on his Will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries.").
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
17. Efforts had been made to remove Pickering from his position as Chief Justice of
New Hampshire for reasons of insanity perhaps associated with alcoholism. RICHARD E.
ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 70
(1971). His appointment to the federal bench where the workload was light apparently
compromised the matter.
18. See JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE 162-76
(1980).
19. ELLIS, supra note 17, at 69-75; 2 GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:
JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at 211-15, 234-38 (1981).
20. Richard E. Ellis, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, in AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRIALS 57-78 (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981); HAW ET AL., supra note 18, at 240.
21. The first appearance of the "opinion of the Court" came in the first decision
rendered after the appointment of Marshall. See2 HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 19, at
383-87. There was a precedent for such a device in the opinions of the Privy Council
giving advice to the Crown, but the Council was not primarily a judicial institution. See
generally John P. Dawson, The Privy Council and Private Law in the Tudor and Stuart
Period: II, 48 MICH. L. REv. 627 (1950) (distinguishing the Privy Council from lower
courts by their lack of appellate review).
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also of the high courts of states that adopted that same instrument of
lawmaking. Whose moral and political tastes would be reflected in
the constitutional and other law made in their published opinions?
Diverse groups had reason for concern.
For many decades, the political role of the federal courts
remained a relatively minor issue. Those courts, whose dockets were
largely devoted to diversity and admiralty cases, seldom decided
matters of great public concern, and devices were found to undo
those few Supreme Court decisions that were widely disapproved.22
State courts were otherwise. The Kentucky legislature set the
standard for others in 1824 by abolishing its highest court in order to
punish its judges' tendency to favor creditors against debtors, but that
action was only a sequel to earlier feuds over who should control the
judicial power of that commonwealth. 23 Issues of debtor-creditor
relations were unpleasant everywhere because economic deflation
impeded the repayment of debt. These issues tended to divide Whigs,
who often favored the protection of the interests of creditors, from
Democrats, who often sought to protect improvident debtors from
losing their farms and homes. Other legislatures were more
constrained but were under continuing pressure to take steps in the
same direction. 24 And governors empowered to nominate citizens to
judicial office were surely exposed to similar public mistrust of their
willingness and ability to pick judges who would faithfully enforce the
law.
One reason for popular mistrust of judges appointed by
politicians was the state of the legal profession. During the century
following the Revolution, the profession was generally unregulated.
And it was open in many states to anyone who was politely
introduced to a local judge by a local lawyer. Abraham Lincoln 25 and
Thomas Cooley,"6 perhaps the two most eminent American lawyers of
the nineteenth century, were admitted to the profession with no
formal educational credentials whatsoever. Both the inherited
English idea that law was an enterprise reserved for the upper class
22. For a fuller statement of the history with more references, see Paul D. Carrington,
Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 79, 81-99.
23. ARNDT M. STICKLES, THE CRITICAL COURT STRUGGLE IN KENTUCKY, 1819-
1829, at 49-62 (1929).
24. See FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS
444-75 (John William Ward ed., 1968).
25. JOHN P. FRANK, LINCOLN ASA LAWYER 10-11 (1991).
26. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC
PROFESSION 21 (1999).
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and the more ancient Roman idea that law is a science known only to
the intellectual elite were simply unacceptable to nineteenth century
American voters. But the absence of firm control of admission to the
bar left governors and legislators with very little basis for the
selection of judges. So why not appoint a friend or political ally?
Thus, a farmer with no legal training who expressed contempt for
professional lawyers served as chief justice of New Hampshire from
1785 to 1797.27
Dissatisfaction with the judicial appointments made by governors
was reinforced by a shared sense that judges should be made to know
that they serve the whole society and ought therefore be accountable
to voters. This was especially true as it became clear to many citizens
that all American appellate judges were following the model of John
Marshall and declaring many kinds of new law in their published
judicial opinions. By the middle of the nineteenth century, in
recognition of their political role, judges were elected in many
states. 28 The practice led the French tourist Alexis de Tocqueville to
observe that American politicians, including American judges, were
greater sycophants than European courtiers, so quick were they to
profess their belief in the superior wisdom of the electorate. 29 But this
faith in the voters was comparative; it may have reflected not so much
admiration for voters and the judges whom they elected as disdain for
the limited wisdom and integrity of the legislators and governors who
27. Chief Justice Dudley urged jurors to disregard the talk of lawyers; "[b]e just and
fear not" was his instruction. WILLIAM PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 154 (A.
P. Peabody ed., 1969). As far as the law was concerned, he said, "[i]t is our business to do
justice between the parties, not by any quirks of the law out of Coke or Blackstone, books
that I never read, and never will, but by common sense and common honesty as between
man and man." Id. In a famous charge to a jury, Dudley said:
You have heard, gentlemen of the jury, what has been said in this case by the
lawyers, the rascals! ... They talk of law. Why gentlemen, it is not the law we
want, but justice. They would govern us by the common law of England. Trust me,
gentlemen, common sense is a much safer guide ... . A clear head and an honest
heart are worth more than all the law of the lawyers.
MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at
57 (1976). Justice Dudley's jurisprudence had an English ancestry in the utterances of the
Levellers. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION REVISITED 230-32 (1997).
28. EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 99-100 (1944). On the
causes of this development, see generally Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly
Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993).
29. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 289-90 (Henry
Reeve trans., Nabu Press 2010) (1835).
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were widely deemed unsuited for the task of selecting and governing
politicized judges.
Judicial elections were also a product of a time when most
lawyers and judges were well known to the agrarian communities of
voters who would elect them. It was also a time in which political
campaigns were the best available form of public entertainment and
received the full attention of many of the all-male voters, most of
whom could be expected to show up at the polls on election day with
some personal information about those for whom they voted. No one
got their information from costly television advertising. Thus,
fashioned in the nineteenth century was the practice of electing
judges by vote of the people, a practice that remains almost unique to
America."o
Electing judges was just one of several important departures
from common law traditions that marked nineteenth century reforms
advanced by citizens of populist sentiment to empower citizens' right
to self-government. Thus, populist sentiments were also advanced by:
the assault on apprenticeship requirements for admission to the bar,
which they rejected as undemocratic sanctuaries of privilege;31 by the
simplification of civil procedure by abolishing the ancient common
law forms of action in order to reduce the amount of arcane
knowledge needed to present a case in court;32 by legitimizing the
contingent fee;33 and by the advent of the American Rule forbidding
routine fee-shifting against losing parties 34 to protect the access of
impecunious plaintiffs to judicial forums. Populists also disfavored the
30. For a comparison of American and European democracy, see generally
EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM (G. Nolte ed., 2005). Well, there is an
exception: Western Samoa, but theirs is a constitution that cannot be difficult to amend.
For a compilation of constitutions, see generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flantz eds., 2011).
31. For brief accounts of their efforts in this field, see BLOOMFIELD, supra note 27, at
32-58; SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN
PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900, at 91-116 (1991).
32. See CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE
PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 43 (1897); ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 171 (1952); Steven N.
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier
Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311,332-33 (1988).
33. SeeF. B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF
PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 14-15 (1964); CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 527 (1986).
34. See generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History ofthe American Rule on Attorney
Fee Recovery, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9 (discussing the history of the
American Rule).
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mysteries of judge-made law and promoted codification to make the
law's texts equally accessible to all.35
While these reforms were being made, state constitutions grew in
length, and many came to provide much more elaborate constraints
on their judiciaries than could be found in the very succinct federal
Constitution that left so much space to judicial interpretation. Of all
the initiatives to revise state constitutions, the campaign to elect
judges was perhaps the strongest and most keenly favored by the
people.3 6 Supreme Court of Ohio Justice Frederick Grimke provided
the most lucid explanation of the time. Grimke explained that elected
judges have greater independence from the unworthy influence of
other officials and their mischievous partisan managers, and might
thus be expected to secure greater trust of the people. He
acknowledged the difficulty faced by voters in discerning the
professional competence of judicial candidates, but endorsed as
imperative the need to subordinate the judicial power to the
collective will of self-governing citizens. He explained that it was not
the primary aim of a judicial election to identify the professionally
best-qualified person available to fill the office, or even the person
whose political views or jurisprudence are preferred by voters. The
primary aim was to assure that any person holding high judicial office
will remember that he is merely a humble citizen of a republic
representing his fellow citizens in the interpretation and enforcement
of legal texts, a perspective less frequently detected in those
appointed to judicial office for the period of "good behavior," as
federal judges are. Voters in many states adhered to that vision of
their constitution.
The considerations identified by Grimke were not without
weight. Tocqueville was impressed by the relative measure of trust
vested by Americans in their courts." Francis Lieber, the Prussian
immigrant and mid-century comparativist, shared that impression,
although he was skeptical that electing judges could be made to work
over the longer term." But the high purpose of electing judges was
expressed more recently by the late eminent federal judge, Richard
35. See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY
OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 185-200 (1981). For a recent review of a very
successful codification movement in nineteenth century Montana, and reconsideration of
this initiative, see generally Andrew P. Morriss et al., Debating the Field Code 105 Years
Later, 61 MONT. L. REV. 371 (2000).
36. SeeHAYNES, supra note 28, at 97-100; Nelson, supra note 28, at 190.
37. See2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 325.
38. See FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 217-24
(Theodore D. Wolsey ed., 3d ed. 1880).
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Arnold, who observed that "the courts, like the rest of the
government, depend on the consent of the governed," and they need
often to be reminded of that dependence.39 That was, and is, indeed
the point ofjudicial elections.
II. ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
North Carolina courts in the eighteenth century were primitive.
Until 1799, there was no right to appeal an adverse judgment, and
therefore no appellate court.40 That year, the trial judges appointed
by the governor were authorized to form a "court of conference" to
meet twice a year to review one another's decisions.4 1 In 1805, that
body was renamed as the supreme court, and in 1810, it was directed
to reduce its decisions to written opinions, for which they were paid a
modest additional fee.42 And the judges were authorized to designate
one of their colleagues as chief justice. In 1818, a separate appellate
institution was established. The justices were then appointed by the
Governor but with the assent of two-thirds of both houses of the
General Assembly.4 3 Although there were surely ample expressions
of Jacksonian political views favoring the election of North Carolina
judges in the antebellum years, it was not until the 1868 constitution
was adopted that North Carolina judges were elected for eight-year
terms." One might view that new state constitution as a Lincolnesque
assurance that "government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish"45 in North Carolina.
In 1894 and 1896, North Carolina judicial elections were bitterly
contested by partisan rivals. 46 In 1900, the state's supreme court
39. Address of Judge Richard Arnold, in SYMP. ON JUDICIARY 12, 12 (Ark. Bar
Found. 1989). Judge Arnold's view of his role was almost surely influenced by his earlier
experience as an elected office holder. He affirmed that "running for office [was] one of
the biggest parts of [his] education," and that he found it "very helpful as [he sat] on the
bench to have had some experience in politics." Id.
40. See Hon. Kemp P. Battle, Address on the History of the Supreme Court 103 N.C.
339, 357-58 (Feb. 4, 1889).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 358.
43. Walter Clark, History ofthe Supreme Court ofNorth Carolina, 177 N.C. 617, 620
(1919).
44. Id.
45. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, Address Delivered
at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), in LAURENCE BERNS ET
AL., ABRAHAM LINCOLN THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 14 (Leo Paul S. de Alvarez ed., 1976).
46. See HELEN G. EDMONDS, THE NEGRO AND FUSION POLITICS IN NORTH
CAROLINA 1894-1901, at 34-35, 48-51 (1951).
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declared unconstitutional legislation enacted in 1899 by the General
Assembly.4 7 The General Assembly responded by impeaching the two
Republican members of the court deemed responsible for this
indignity, but the impeachment did not receive the two-thirds vote in
the Senate necessary to remove the justices from office.48
Lord James Bryce at the end of the nineteenth century,
notwithstanding such troubled moments as these in North Carolina,
assessed American state courts for an audience of English barristers
and counselors as roughly equal in professional respect with the
federal judges who were appointed by the President even though they
lacked the royal affect associated with life tenure, a trait often
attributed to Article III judges serving "during good [b]ehaviour."49
III. PROGRESSIVE REFORMS
The Progressive Movement of the early twentieth century
transformed judicial elections in many states. Progressives of that
time rested great hope in the ability of trained professionals to do the
right thing in all fields of endeavor, but they also generally confided
in the judgment and integrity of citizen-voters. Reformers of the
Progressive era favored public elections, and so they devised
referenda, partisan primaries,so and recall elections. A notable event
of the era was President Taft's veto of the admission of Arizona to
statehood because its constitution, approved by the territory's voters,
included a provision for popular recall of a judge deemed responsible
for an unpopular judgment." The Arizona Constitution was amended
47. See Edward B. Clark, The Discipline and Removal ofJudges in North Carolina, 4
CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1981).
48. Id. at 14.
49. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH
486-88 (2d ed. 1891).
50. See CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM & LOUISE OVERACKER, PRIMARY
ELECTIONS 1-4 (1928).
51. See William H. Taft, President of the United States of America, Remarks at the
White House on the Veto of the Arizona Enabling Act 1-2 (Aug. 22, 1911), available at
http://www.bobsuniverse.com/BWAH/27-Taft/19110822a.pdf ("This provision of the
Arizona constitution, in its application to county and state judges, seems to me so
pernicious in its effect, so destructive of independence in the judiciary, so likely to subject
the rights of the individual to the possible tyranny of a popular -majority, and, therefore,
to be so injurious to the cause of free government, that I must disapprove a constitution
containing it."); J. Patrick White, Progressivism and the Judiciary: A Study of the
Movement for Judicial Reform, 1901-1917, at 150 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Michigan) (on file with author). Recall was first adopted in Oregon in 1908,
and little consideration was given to the possible exclusion of judges from that provision.
See generally ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM: THE STORY OF DIRECT
LEGISLATION IN OREGON (1912) (discussing the adoption of recall elections in Oregon).
1976 [Vol. 89
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to delete the offending clause so that President Taft might sign the
statehood resolution. But the Progressive people of the new state
then promptly amended their constitution to provide for popular
recall of judges.5 2 This provision is the most extreme application of
the principle favoring judicial accountability as a constraint on misuse
ofjudicial independence."
Another Progressive reform was the partisan primary. It was
intended to weaken political party leadership and empower individual
citizen-voters. But it had the unintended effect of increasing the
likelihood that an unknown and seriously under-qualified individual
with a familiar or attractive name might capture a judicial office. With
rare exception, the smoke-filled room of partisan politics, whatever
its failings, seldom results in the nomination of candidates who are a
sordid embarrassment to their party, as can happen with open
primaries. And the likelihood that a corrupt or incompetent judge
would be elected was increased as the number of elected offices grew,
along with the number of voters, thus spreading voter attention ever
thinner and making it less likely that voters shared their personal
acquaintances with candidates.54
Leaders of the organized legal profession that emerged in the
late nineteenth century reacted against contestable judicial
elections." Still, many Progressives of the early twentieth century
acknowledged the wisdom and virtue of the electorate. The American
Judicature Society was organized to marshal the support of the bar
organizations to advance a compromise with the Progressive
sentiment favoring democratic elections." The compromise was
52. SeeARIZ. CONST. art. VIII; White, supra note 51, at 217-21.
53. For a useful summary of the diverse methods of removing judges to be observed
among the fifty states, see Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of State Judges, AM.
JUDICATURE SoC'Y, http://wwwjudicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/removal
ofjudges.cfm?state (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). Examples are provided below.
54. For example, in 1900, there were nineteen judges sitting in North Carolina courts.
See 127 N.C. REPS. iii-vii. The number in 2001 was 138. See generally N.C. JUDGES
DIRECTORY (2001) (listing current judges in North Carolina).
55. See generally Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration ofJustice, 20 JUDICATURE 178 (1937) (describing the public dissatisfaction
with the justice system and noting that the politicization of judges has been a chief cause);
William H. Taft, The Selection and Tenure ofJudges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418 (1913) (arguing
that election, rather than appointment, leads to less expertise on the bench). An
antecedent to the Progressive efforts to reform judicial elections was led by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which sought in 1873 to replace the
judicial election provisions of the state constitution of 1867. For an account, see Rende
Lettow Lerner, From Popular Control to Independence: Reform of the Elected Judiciary in
Boss Tweed'sNew York, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 109, 156-59 (2007).
56. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A
1977
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labeled "merit selection." The "Missouri Plan" became a model of
that scheme." It conferred the appointment power on the governor
but limited that officer's choice to a list of nominees selected by a
panel, preferably comprised of professional elites.5 9 The scheme
limited judges to terms, but required them to stand for retention by
the voters without an opposing candidate, a scheme that made them
accountable but not subject to the hazards of political competition.
That Progressive "Missouri Plan" or numerous variations of it
have been, over time, adopted by over thirty states, most commonly
only for the judges sitting on highest state courts or intermediate
courts of appeal.6 0 The state nominating commissions vary in their
memberships and the process by which their members are selected. A
simple example is Wyoming. Its group has seven members: the Chief
Justice, three lawyers elected by the bar, and three non-lawyers
appointed by the Governor.6 1 The Tennessee commission, however,
has seventeen members, including six appointed by each speaker of a
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 1-28 (1992).
57. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS
passim (2011), available athttp://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial
MeritCharts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf; AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, MERIT SELECTION: THE
BEST WAY TO CHOOSE THE BEST JUDGES passim, available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/ms-descrip 1185462202120.pdf. See
generally Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Far, and Competent
Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839
(1994) (arguing that judicial reliance on political and financial support has compromised
judicial independence).
58. See Schoshinski, supra note 57, at 847-48. For an account of the variations, see
Polly J. Price, Selection ofState Court Judges, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY:
JUDGING THE JUDGES 9, 16-19 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996).
59. This last feature continues to evoke opposition from the less elite, not least
including business interests. See, e.g., Without Judicial Merit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2008, at
A 10.
Though the Missouri Plan is supposed to keep politics out of the process, it has
instead transferred power from voters to state bar associations and legal groups
that control the judicial commission. The result is a system that's contentious and
opaque-and has tipped the state courts steadily to the left.
Id. A significant difference in Missouri Plans lies in the mode of selecting the panel. For a
consideration of the options, see Tillman J. Finley, Note, Judicial Selection in Alaska:
Justifications and Proposed Courses ofReform, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 49, 55-64 (2002). For
a skeptical assessment of merit selection, see generally Michael R. Domino, The Futile
Quest for a System ofJudicial "Merit" Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803 (2004).
60. California, for example, created a panel to select judges from a list supplied by the
Governor. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12011.5 (West 2005).
61. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4.
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house of the legislature and five representatives of diverse bar
groups.62
Two New England states continue to authorize gubernatorial
appointments, while Virginia and South Carolina vest the initial
selection in the legislature.6 3 These longstanding methods do avoid
arousing resistance to elitism without incurring the disadvantages of
judicial campaigns." But it remains true that over eighty percent of
the trials conducted in all American courts are conducted by judges
who were elected or who are subject to the risk of non-retention by
vote of the people.6 5
As noted, North Carolina remains among the states whose
constitutions require competitive election of all judges. And all four
of the listed problems with that means of selection have been
magnified in the last half century by two developments: the advent of
television that vastly elevates the cost of political campaigns, and the
simultaneous elevation of the political role of highest courts that
increases the importance of ideological considerations. At least partly
in response to these developments, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Tennessee were inspired in the decade from 1967 to 1977 to
adopt variations on the Missouri Plan for their highest courts. 66 But
North Carolina stuck to general elections with primaries, although
not without reconsideration of the Missouri Plan."
IV. THE FOUR ENDURING PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Identified in the introduction to this Article are four problems
inhering to judicial elections. It may be helpful to examine each
briefly.
62. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-102 to -112 (2009).
63. Judicial Selection in the States, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, http://www
judicialselection.us (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
64. An advocate of this scheme is Stephen J. Ware. See generally Stephen J. Ware,
The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 Mo. L. REV. 751 (2009) (characterizing the
Missouri Plan as elitist and advocating, instead, executive nomination and senate
confirmation as a way to avoid the disadvantages of both merit selection and popular
election).
65. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and Democratic
Accountability, 61 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 149, 154.
66. Judicial Selection in the States: Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC'Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection-ofjudges.cfm
?state= (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
67. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, FUTURE OF THE COURTS: REPORT TO THE
1998 SESSION OF THE 1997 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 3-5, 8 (1998).
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A. Campaign Promises
The first, and most obvious, problem is the need to constrain
campaign promises limiting the independence of the judge if elected.
A judge rendering a decision in conformity with a campaign promise
is visibly denying a fair hearing to the losing party, and thus offending
the most elementary feature of due process of law. To constrain such
a practice, the American Bar Association promulgated its Canons of
Judicial Ethics in 1924,68 and in 1972 it published its Model Code of
Judicial Conduct,6 9 which it intended to be enforced by a disciplinary
system. But, in 2002, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional
right of judicial candidates to make campaign promises bearing on the
resolution of future cases, 7 o invalidating a Minnesota law enacted
pursuant to the Model Code to shield the state's elected judges from
the practice of making promises that is generally associated with
campaign politics. The Minnesota law had provided that a "candidate
for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge," shall not
"announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.""1
A possible implication of the Court's decision is that a state
choosing to elect judges must simply forfeit the integrity and
independence of its judiciary. But as J.J. Gass has forcefully affirmed,
"due process rights of individual litigants are not the state's to
forfeit."72 Justice O'Connor was moved by this consideration to
publish a concurring opinion expressing doubt that it is possible to
have an election of a disinterested judiciary deserving the public's
respect. She explained that:
We of course want judges to be impartial, in the sense of being
free from any personal stake in the outcome of the cases to
68. AM. BAR ASS'N, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES 29 (1936).
69. JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.03 (4th ed. 2007).
The Code was rewritten in 1990 in ways not important to the present discussion, and
amended in 2007 to respond to the problem presented by the Supreme Court's decision in
Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
70. See Republican Party oflMinn., 536 U.S. at 788. For an analysis of this case and the
implications on state judicial campaign regulation, see generally Richard L. Hasen, First
Amendment Limits on Regulating Judicial Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 15
(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
71. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2006).
72. J.J. GASS, AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS 10 (2004), available athttp://brennan.3cdn.net/0b74af850b81d92928_bvm6y5sdf
.pdf. For a discussion of the relationship between canons ofjudicial ethics and due process,
see Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech:Restramntand Libertyin Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059,1083-92 (1996).
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which they are assigned. But if judges are subject to regular
elections they are likely to feel that they have at least some
personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case. Elected
judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied
with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their
reelection prospects. Even if judges were able to suppress their
awareness of the potential electoral consequences of their
decisions and refrain from acting on it, the public's confidence
in the judiciary could be undermined simply by the possibility
that judges would be unable to do so.73
Justice O'Connor had a point. And, as a person who was herself
once elected to such an office by the voters of Arizona,7 4 her view
may be entitled to added weight. On the other hand, as one who was
appointed to office "for life," her implication that such appointments
are the only way to select independent judges has a self-
congratulatory ring. That system liberating judges from any
accountability for their politically motivated decisions has its
problems, too."
The Court did not join in Justice O'Connor's opinion,76 but its
ruling was further elaborated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit on remand when it invalidated other Minnesota
rules advanced by the American Bar Association that foreclosed
partisanship of judicial candidates and forbid them from making
direct requests to contributors for campaign funds."
73. See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). Justice O'Connor cited Julian Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State
Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 739
(1994) (quoting former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus's statement that
ignoring the political consequences of visible decisions is "like ignoring a crocodile in your
bathtub"). See also Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 759, 793-94 (1995) (citing statistics indicating that judges who face elections are
far more likely to override jury sentences of life without parole and impose the death
penalty than are judges who do not run for election).
74. See JOAN BISKPUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON
THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 35 (2005).
75. See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (providing a
comprehensive discussion of term limits and lifetime tenure of United States Supreme
Court Justices).
76. However, all the Justices are seen to share her distaste for judicial elections. See
Joan C. Rogers, Caperton Ruling is Expected to Spur States to Enhance Their Process for
JudicialRecusal, 77 U.S. L. WK. 1780, 1780 (2009).
77. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 763-66 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
198 1
HeinOnline  -- 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1981 2010-2011
NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
B. The Appearance of Corruption
The second and closely related problem with judicial elections,
greatly increased in the age of television, is the funding of vastly more
expensive campaigns. Citizens often perceive large contributions as
bribes." Laws limiting the size of individual campaign contributions
present a different issue under the First Amendment, 9 and such limits
may not work."o Even under the best of circumstances, raising money
for judicial candidates is problematic because of the unsuitability of
judicial campaign promises made in exchange for financial support."1
And there is a related problem of a candidate's temptation to raise
excessive campaign funds or even to continue raising money after the
election has been held.82 When campaign funds are left over, it may
78. See JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES & RACHEL WEISS, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at 20-24 (2007) (highlighting a recent dip in the effectiveness
of large monetary contributions to judges' election campaigns); Anthony Champagne,
Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REv. 669, 672-74 (2001) (describing
television advertisements as a medium to criticize opponents, "portraying them as
corrupted by campaign contributions [or] tools of special interests"); Deborah Goldberg,
Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, THE RISING
POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73, 77 (Matthew
Streb ed., 2007) (noting a rise in "[tihe perception that our courts are titled toward
wealthy interests"). For comparisons to the problem in other democracies, see generally
Justin Fisher, Party Finance and Corruption: Britain, in PARTY FINANCE AND POLITICAL
CORRUPTION 15 (Robert Williams ed., 2000); James Newell, Party Finance and
Corruption:Italy, in PARTY FINANCE AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION 61 (Robert Williams
ed., 2000).
79. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1976) (finding political contribution
ceiling law too restrictive); Randall v. Sorell, 548 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2006) (upholding
Buckley). For contrasting critiques of Buckley, compare Burt Neuborne, Toward A
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055-58
(1999) (arguing that Buckley was "unduly hasty" in removing the advancement of political
equality as a justification for limiting campaign spending), and Bradley A. Smith, Money
Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality and Campaign Fiance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 47-48 (1997)
(advocating for a "political equality" view of campaign financing regulations), with
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund Raising: Why Campaign
SpendingLimits MayNot Violate the First AmendmentAfter All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281,
1283-84 (1994) (focusing on protection of candidates' time as a justification for campaign
finance reform). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 94-100 (1993) (suggesting alternatives for regulating campaign financing
following Buckley).
80. For reasoned skepticism about the effectiveness of these limitations, see Roy A.
Schotland, Campaign Finance: Just an Illusion ofReform, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 1, 2003, at 30.
81. See generally David Barnhizer, On the Make: Campaign Funding and the
Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361 (2001) (discussing the
effect of campaign financing on judicial candidate's behavior); Steven P. Croley, The
Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689
(1995) (discussing the justifications and downfalls of elective judiciaries).
82. See Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges'
Robes the Emperor's Clothes ofAmerican Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 90-96 (1985).
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be possible to spend unused campaign contributions on items such as
country club dues or a new car to be used while campaigning.
The elevation of campaign expenditures was assisted by section
527 of the Internal Revenue Code as enacted in 2001." By that law,
Congress encouraged organizations to engage in public education that
may be aimed at issues presented in judicial campaigns, and indirectly
at candidates. It allows deductions from taxable income for
contributions to educational organizations. As long as such groups
refrain from "express advocacy" of specific candidacies, their
supporters can claim deductions for "soft money" campaigns
addressed to issues. 84
The resemblance of big campaign contributions to bribes is most
visible when a judge is asked to disqualify himself or herself from
deciding a case in which a major contributor is a party. The Chamber
of Commerce is almost never a party and, therefore, has the
advantage of having no direct stake in cases of the sort that might
disqualify judges deciding them. But the issue of contributions as
bribes was forcefully presented in 2005 by the conduct of Justice
Lloyd Karmeier of the Illinois Supreme Court. After accepting over
$350,000 from diverse employees of State Farm Insurance Company
for his 2004 campaign, he refused a request to disqualify himself from
casting the deciding vote in favor of State Farm on its appeal from an
adverse judgment requiring it to pay punitive damages. 6 His court
held, in effect, that a judge might not be disqualified merely because
of a large campaign contribution." Certiorari was denied."
But the event resonated with the rising cry of "Payola Justice,"89
and seemed contrary to earlier decisions of the Supreme Court
83. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of26 U.S.C.).
84. See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign
Finance Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 10-11 (A. Corrado et
al. eds., 2005) (tracing the history of campaign finance reform). See generallyM. Mellman
& R. Wirthin, Public Views of'Party Soft Money, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
BATTLE 266 (Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann & Trevor Potter eds., 2003) (discussing
the American public's perspective on large political contributions).
85. Leonard Post, Contributions to Justice Lead to Protest: Ethics Case Highhghts
Judicial Election Issue, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 13, 2006, at 4.
86. Id.
87. BriefAmici Curiae of 12 Organizations Concerned about the Influence of Money
on Judicial Integrity, Impartiality, and Independence in Support of Petitioners at 1-2,
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006) (No. 05-842).
88. A very, 547 U.S. at 1003.
89. The term, describing contributions as bribes, was circulated in Bill Medaille &
Andrew Wheat, Texans for Public Justice, Payola Justice: How Texas Supreme Court
1983
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holding that it is a denial of due process of law to submit a case to the
decision of a judge having a stake in the outcome.9 0 The Illinois case
deciding not to disqualify Justice Karmeier was followed in 2008 by a
similar West Virginia case.9' In an extraordinary gesture, the
Conference of Chief Justices was among the many groups seeking as
amici to convince the Supreme Court that excessive campaign
support disqualifies the judge receiving it from sitting on cases in
which his benefactor is a party. The Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 vote,
decided in 2009 that it was indeed a denial of due process to a litigant
for a judge to cast a deciding vote in favor of a former client who had
invested three million dollars in his election campaign. 92 But maybe
one million would be alright? The dissenters expressed concern that
the decision would invite many more motions to disqualify a sitting
judge.93 The Wall Street Journal vigorously protested the decision as a
threat to the freedom of institutions to invest money in securing an
amiable judiciary.94
While few surely doubt that much of the money contributed to
judicial candidates is given for benign public motives, there can also
be no doubt that such big contributions have an appearance gravely
prejudicial to public confidence in the disinterest and integrity of the
judiciary. Some recall the defensive utterance attributed to
Chancellor Francis Bacon,95 that he only accepted gifts from litigants
whose cases he favored on the merits. And there are visible
correlations between contributions and judicial decisions that do
Justices Raise Money from Court Litigants 29 (1998) (analogizing the election campaign
contributions of today to the early rock and roll executive's practice of paying disk jockeys
to play their records in hopes of making it a hit). The subject in Texas was examined by
CBS's 60 Minutes in 1987 and 1998. 60 Minutes: Justice for Sale (CBS television broadcast
Dec. 6, 1987); 60 Minutes: Justice for Sale (CBS television broadcast Nov. 1, 1998). For
comment, see Texas Justice: The Needs for Reform and Reality Are Both Great HOUS.
CHRON., July 12, 1998, at 2C.
90. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 531, 531, 534-35 (1927).
91. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008), rev'd 129 S.
Ct. 2252 (2009).
92. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2252-57.
93. Id. at 2267-74 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("This will inevitably lead to an increase
in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be."); id. at
2274-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that lawyers would "contest[] nonrecusal decisions
through every available means").
94. Editorial, Judges and 'Bias'- The Supremes Trample on State Courts, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl24451495768196807.html.
95. DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON 222 (1992) ("As Bacon himself said,
'Of my offense, I will say [which] I have good warrant for, they were not the greatest
sinners in Israel upon whom the wall of Shilo fell .. . I was the justest judge that was in
England these fifty years . . . .").
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suggest that the judicial office, if not the judge, may be purchased
with campaign contributions.9 6
The American Bar Association has undertaken to prepare
guidelines for courts facing the issue of disqualification and has
convened a Standing Committee on Judicial Independence." Despite
the Supreme Court's leanings, it is surely time for all states to
strengthen rules of judicial conduct requiring disqualification in cases
in which a party, or his counsel, or an organization committed to the
party's interests, has made a substantial monetary investment in the
judge's election.
C. The Shortage of Voter Information
The third problem with elections is that, despite the Progressive
belief in the wisdom of informed voters, we who vote are seldom
sufficiently interested to know much about the judicial candidates for
whom we vote. Primaries increase the number of candidates whom
we are expected to recognize, but also the number of candidates of
whom we are likely to be ignorant." Judicial elections are especially
at risk of being governed by the axiom of eighty percent attributed to
Charles Geyh99 : it dictates that eighty percent of voters support the
continued election of judges, eighty percent will not vote in judicial
96. See Vernon V. Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in
Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the
Judicial Function, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1291, 1291 (2008); see also Adam Liptak, Looking
AnewatCampaign Cash and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A14 (describing
the study by Palmer and Levendis and other studies of campaign contributions by litigants
and judicial decisions in contributors' favor). For a direct challenge to this study, see
generally Kevin R. Tully & E. Phelps Gray, The Louisiana Supreme Court Defended: A
Rebuttal of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical Study of the Effects of
Campaign Money on the Judicial Trail, 69 LA. L. REV. 281 (2009). Another scholar
suggests that the best way to preserve "judicial integrity without violating First
Amendment protections" is to use "independent, non-governmental monitoring
'commissions.'" See Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Judicial Restraint: Resolving the Constitutional
Tension Between First Amendment Protection of Political Speech and the Compelling
Interest inPreserving Judicial Integrity During Judicial Elections, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
757, 760 (2006).
97. Its report is on the agenda of the ABA House of Delegates. Maria da Silva,
ReinvigorateRecusalReform, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/reinvigoraterecusal-reform/.
98. See Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial
Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 140, 150-56 (Matthew J. Streib ed., 2007) (describing
the demography of those who vote on judicial elections).
99. Robert Rackleff, Judicial Elections: Still Fair and Balanced?, CARNEGIE REP.,
Spring 2006, at 12, 16, available athttp://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications
/Reporter/PDF/carnegiereporter-v3n4.pdf.
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elections, eighty percent of those who do are unable to identify the
judicial candidates for whom they vote, and eighty percent suppose
that judges are influenced by the campaign contributions they receive.
The inattention of voters to judicial elections has produced some
extraordinarily unwelcome results in some other states that North
Carolina has so far escaped. One recurring result has been the
occasional success of grievously unqualified candidates who
happened to share a name with a popular figure.' 0 The worst case of
misrecognition was that of Donald Burt Yarborough, who was elected
in 1976 at the age of thirty-five to the Supreme Court of Texas
because voters thought that he was the same Don Yarborough for
whom they had voted in races for other state offices (who was, in
turn, mistaken for Ralph Yarborough, a United States Senator).' 0'
But he was not. His unsuitability was not revealed until he had won
the primary election and was in a commanding position in the general
election. Shortly after his election, he was indicted for diverse frauds
and fled to Granada. In 1986, he was convicted of bribery in a federal
court and served a six-year prison term.'02 As it happened, Justice
Yarborough did not decide many cases, but that was just a lucky
break for the people of Texas.
D. Competitive Defamation
Finally, the advent of television dramatically elevated the
availability and effectiveness of campaign methods demeaning to the
public office, perhaps especially judicial office, and the candidates
seeking it.o" An important aim of the American Bar Association
Code was to maintain public trust in the law by forbidding those
campaign practices most likely to call the integrity of judicial
candidates into public question or otherwise demean the office being
contested." Judges have been subjected to discipline for gross
100. In 1964, as an Ohioan, I rang door bells in a futile effort to help re-elect an able
but doomed Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court who was opposed by a candidate who
shared the name of the legendary coach of the Cleveland Browns.
101. KYLE CHEEK & ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN TEXAS:
PARTISANSHIP, MONEY, AND POLITICS IN STATE COURTS 39 (2005).
102. See id.; Donald Burt Yarborough, TARLTON LAW LIBRARY JAMAIL CTR. FOR
LEGAL RESEARCH, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (last updated Oct. 16,2009), http://tarlton
.law.utexas.edu/justices/spct/yarbrough.html.
103. See generally SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 78 (describing how the increased usage
of television ads funded by special interest groups threatens the fairness of state court
judicial elections).
104. Other problems with television advertising campaigns are recounted by Deborah
Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of Judges and the Rules of
Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 98 (2003).
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violations of such rules.'o But the constraints abide only in the
shadow of the Supreme Court's extensions of the First Amendment
that may be held to bar their enforcement."o'
Defamatory advertising in contested judicial elections has
flourished in Alabama in 1996,"o' Nebraska in 1996,"os Ohio in 2000,o9
West Virginia in 2004,110 Georgia in 2006," Wisconsin in 2008,112 and
perhaps elsewhere. For example, in Wisconsin in 2008, a justice won
election to the state supreme court by accusing his incumbent
adversary of responsibility for a rape committed by a former client.
The incumbent had long before, as a public defender, unsuccessfully
defended a client against a charge of rape. His client had then served
a prison term and, on his release, committed another rape. The false
attribution of responsibility to the incumbent for the second rape by
his former client was expressed with an investment of many, many
campaign dollars spent on television advertising uniting the
incumbent and his former client, who are both African Americans, on
voters' television screens, where their images were placed side-by-
side while the voice-over explained the incumbent's vicarious guilt for
his client's crime." 3 The newly elected Justice Gableman invoked the
First Amendment as a defense to the accusation of professional
105. William Glaberson, States Rein In Truth-Bending in Court Races: Judges Face
Penalties for Deceiving Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at Al.
106. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Benchmarks: Judges on Trial, Judicial Selection and
Election, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 451, 462-66 (2009); cf Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312,
1320-21 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that speech by judicial candidates is not entitled to less
protection than speech by legislative and executive candidates).
107. Stan Bailey, Ingram's Ads Likely Caused Voter Disgust, Analyst Says,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 7,1996, at IA.
108. See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the
Defeat ofJusticesLanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70-71 (1999).
109. See generally Kara Baker, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio
Judicial Elections and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio
Supreme Court, 35 AKRON L. REV. 159 (2001) (discussing issues in judicial campaigning
and potential solutions).
110. See Brian P. Anderson, Judicial Elections in West Virginia: "By the People, For the
People" or "By the Powerful for the Powerful?" A Choice Must Be Made, 107 W. VA. L.
REV. 235, 255-59 (2004).
111. See Jill Young Miller, Hunstein Wins Supreme Court Race, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/elections/entries/2006/11
/08/georgiasupreme.html.
112. See Ryan J. Foley, Gableman Criminal Probe Urged-Justice Accused of Breaking
Law in Campaign, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 21, 2008, at A3; Dee J. Hall, Was Ad Misleading, or a
Lie?-Gableman Seeks to A void Discipline for Commercial, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at
A3.
113. Scott Bayer, Supreme Court Justice Denies TVAd Was Misleading, CHANNEL
3000, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.channel3000.com/news/18019438/detail.html.
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misconduct.114 The Wisconsin Judicial Commission conducted a
proceeding to discipline Justice Gableman,"' but he remains on the
court.
V. MAGNIFYING EFFECTS OF NATIONAL POLITICS ON STATE
COURTS
All four of these problems with judicial election campaigns were
magnified in the last half of the twentieth century, not only by the
advent of commercial television, but also by national political
developments blurring the distinctions between judges and the
executive branches, and between judges and legislators."' The notion
of constitutional separation of powers lost much of its slender claim
on the minds of citizens.'" In the 1960s, the Warren Court led the way
in constitutionalizing issues for resolution by Justices that many
populist citizens had long assumed were subject to their democratic
control. Some of those issues continued to percolate in state politics
attentive to issues of judicial administration.
A. The Capital Punishment Issue
Capital punishment had long been an issue evoking strong
responses. The Supreme Court of the United States was, for a time in
the 1970s, clearly headed toward the abolition of capital punishment
by judicial decree."' The Justices prudently detected that voters and
state legislatures were not ready to accept such a reform."9 But the
114. Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964) (relating to the Court's
previous disposition on the First Amendment and libel).
115. A proceeding was commenced by the Wisconsin Judicial Commission on October
7, 2008, in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. See Patrick Marley & Steven Walters, Judicial
Commission Says Gableman Ad was Deceiving, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 2008,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/32440994.htm.
116. Edward L. Rubin, Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 56, 86-87
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
117. Although it was not as confused as it would become when Congress undertook to
determine the medical condition and decided the case of Theresa Schiavo. See, e.g., Relief
of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1, 119 Stat. 15, 15 (giving the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida jurisdiction to rule on an
immediate injunction to prevent withdrawal of life support); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272-75 (11th Cir. 2005).
118. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972). See generally MICHAEL
MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(1973) (describing the efforts of a group of civil rights lawyers to abolish capital
punishment during the 1960s and early 1970s).
119. For a critical assessment of the Court's treatment of capital punishment from the
1970s to the 1990s, see generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
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Supreme Court of California and some other state courts were
inspired by the Supreme Court of the United States' "activist" role
model to tackle the issue.
There was already strong political resistance to the California
court for other decisions,""0 but Chief Justice Rose Bird nevertheless
took up the cause against capital punishment and persuaded her
colleagues to invoke an implied meaning of the text of the state
constitution to forbid it. Her court was, however, soon reversed by
the voters with an amendment to that constitutional text achieved by
popular referendum, a device available in California and a few
western states.'21 The conflict over that referendum led to a sustained
and ultimately successful popular struggle to rid the California courts
of Chief Justice Bird. She and two sympathetic colleagues were not
retained in a heated election in 1986.122 That event was rightly
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment,
109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
120. Especially in the years from 1970 to 1978, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Donald Wright, the court had made a number of decisions of extraordinarily high salience,
causing then-Governor Ronald Reagan, who had appointed Wright, to despise the court
and his appointee. BETTY MEDSGER, FRAMED: THE NEW RIGHT ATTACK ON CHIEF
JUSTICE BIRD AND THE COURTS 20, 28-29 (1983). For an account of the further reactions
that Wright's successor evoked, see generally PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE
INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT (1981). Among
the court's more consequential decisions was the invalidation of a state law governing
public school finance in Serrano v. Priest. 487 P.2d. 1241, 1243 (1971). See generally
William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607 (1996)
(discussing the unforeseen and unintended secondary and tertiary consequences of the
Serrano decision); Stanley Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in State Constitutional Rights
Law, ANNALS, March 1988, at 54 (describing the Serrano ordeal from the perspective of a
member of that court).
121. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9. This experience was repeated in 2008 on the issue of gay
marriage. The court held that such marriages were protected by the state constitution. In
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 429 (2008). And it was promptly reversed by a
referendum, Proposition 8, California Marriage Protection Act, by adding § 7.5 to Article
I of the state constitution, which borrowed the text of the statute invalidated by the court.
California Marriage Protection Act, Proposition 8 (2008) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 7.5). Litigation challenging the validity of the amendment continues. See also John
Schwartz & Jesse McKinley, Court Weighs Voters' Will Against Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2009, at A 12 (discussing the dilemma presented to the California Supreme Court
by successful passage of Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in the state).
122. For accounts of the 1986 election, see John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Judicial
Reform in California, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 139, 156 (Anthony
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993); Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of
Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969,
1980 (1988). See generally Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial
Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of
the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1986) (using the retention election campaign of Chief
Justice Bird as an illustration of the many issues surrounding judicial elections in general).
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alarming to the state's organized bar and others rightly concerned for
the professional independence of the judiciary. The money spent on
the political campaigns for and against the three justices may well
exceed the sums spent in contemporaneous gubernatorial elections.
The campaign against Bird also elevated our awareness of the ease
with which voters can sometimes be influenced by the suggestion that
a judge or candidate might be "soft on crime."
B. One Man, One Vote
Also elevating the problems with judicial elections were the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States establishing the
new constitutional principle of "one man, one vote."' 23 Those
decisions empowered highest state courts to play a major role in
establishing the boundaries for the political constituencies of
Congressmen and state legislators. Whether a neighborhood was in
one election precinct or another was a question assigned ultimately to
highest state courts, which were empowered to review the
constitutionality of each wrinkle in precinct boundaries to assure
equality of populations and compliance with other constitutional
standards.
A secondary consequence of that constitutional "reform" was the
1996 defeat of Justice Penny White in Tennessee. She was highly
recommended for retention by the state's Judicial Evaluation
Commission and was well regarded by the bar.124 A group that had
been organized and funded solely to cause her defeat nevertheless
attacked her. Its aim was to assure Republican control over the state's
redistricting decisions that were soon to be made by the court of
which she was the swing member. The organization's attack was
mounted on spot commercials calling attention to her vote with a
majority of her colleagues requiring a rehearing on the sentencing
phase of a celebrated capital case. The court had modified the state's
procedure in order to meet requirements imposed by the Supreme
Court of the United States.125 To do so required a postponement of an
execution. On the basis of her vote for that result, she was portrayed
in television ads as the defender of a vicious murderer.126
123. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-56 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08
(1962).
124. Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court's Thoughts: The High Price of Judicial
Elections, 3 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 29, 44-45 (2008); Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims
A Tennessee Judge, WASH. POST, Nov. 26,1996, at Cll.
125. State v. Odom, 928 S.W,2d 18,25 (Tenn. 1996).
126. See McCarthy, supra note 124.
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C. TheRight to Defame
The events in Wisconsin and Tennessee demonstrated the
power of advertising to falsify a sitting judge's record as one "soft on
crime" to be presented when it suits the desires of an interest group
to unseat a judge. 127 That demonstration has been observed in other
retention elections. In a 2004 Missouri retention election, such
defamation resulted in a very close call.128 But such false advertising is
also an exercise of a constitutional right established in 1964 by the
Supreme Court assuring citizens of the right to express defamatory
statements about public figures.' Thus, state law cannot constrain
such utterances. Those standing for election to judicial office must,
pursuant to the First Amendment, expose themselves to such abuse.
The temptation to defame and demean may be especially
threatening to the judiciary in retention elections because the
defamers are less subject to the deterrent effect of competition in
which a competitor may reply in kind and "give as good as he gets."
Perhaps when the advertising is blatantly false, and the defamer can
be identified (which is not always easy), this form of outrage could be
deterred by the disciplinary process;' but, again, the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence casts doubt."3 ' It seems clear
that the Constitution now protects the right of a hostile organization
to dredge up a single vote that some voters can be led to
misunderstand and disapprove and call public attention to it over, and
over, and over. And the claim is made that such organizations, having
no connection to a candidate, are outside the reach of any state
election laws and are merely exercising their First Amendment
127. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done
Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 313 (1997).
128. See Donna Walter, Supporters Rally to Defense of MO Supreme Court Judge
RichardB. Teitelman, DAILY REC. (Kansas City, Mo.), Nov. 1, 2004, available athttp://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qn4l81/is 20041 101/ai n10066272/ (describing the efforts of
Judge Teitelman's supporters required to combat the negative publicity campaign of his
detractors).
129. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964) (upholding the right
unless actual malice is shown).
130. Disciplinary efforts have been elevated in Ohio and perhaps elsewhere. See
Robert Derocher, Bar Associations and Judicial Campaigns, JUDGES' J., Winter 2005, at
41, 41-42. For a recent proposal, see Cathy R. Silak & Aaron C. Charrier, The Future of
Judicial Elections: A Campaign Conduct Commission Proposal, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 357,
372-75 (2003).
131. SeePaul D. Carrington, OurImperialFirstAmendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167,
1188, 1197-1203 (2001) (elaborating on the Court's jurisprudence regarding the First
Amendment and commercial advertising).
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rights. 13 2 They may even be categorizing their spending as "public
education" and deducting the cost of such advertising from their
taxable income.
In some cases, degradation of the specific candidate for retention
may be unnecessary. For example, Justice Russell Nigro, a member of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania elected in 1995 was not retained
in 2005 in an outcry of indignation over a pay raise for judges and
other elected officials of the state. Never mind that the judge not
retained had nothing to do with the pay raise other than an apparent
willingness to receive it.133 Only eighteen percent of the voters cast a
vote on the issue of his retention, and a slight majority of those who
did were opposed to the pay raise.1' Whether the outcome had
anything to do with any of his judicial decisions is not certain.
D. Abortion Rights; Gay Rights
Similar to capital punishment in its consequences for high court
judges has been the emergence of claims to constitutional family law
rights to an abortion or to a single sex marriage." In 2009, the Iowa
Supreme Court unanimously held that there is, under the equal
protection clause of the Iowa constitution, a right of a same-sex
couple to marry.'36 In 2010, three members of the court were on the
ballot for retention, and none was retained."' A fourth justice who
participated in the decision faces a retention election in 2012.
Meanwhile, a group of five conservative legislators filed articles of
impeachment against the other four members of the Iowa Supreme
Court; it does not seem likely that the State Senate will pursue the
impeachment process, but their action is nevertheless illustrative of
the public sentiment toward the court's pro gay-marriage decision."'
132. See Douglas Johnson & Mike Beard, Campaign Reform:Let's Not Give Politicians
the Power to Decide What We Can Say About Them, 31 CATO Institute Briefing Papers 7,
(1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=1470) (defending the
First Amendment rights of third parties to publicly criticize candidates for judgeships).
133. Shira J. Goodman & Lynn A. Marks, Lessons from an UnusualRetention Election,
CT. REV., Fall/Winter 2006, at 6, 8-11. Justice Sandra Shultz Newman, a Republican, was
narrowly granted retention in the same election that Nigro, a Democrat, lost. Id. at 11
n.52.
134. Id. at 6, 11.
135. This was inspired, of course, by Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (explaining
that "zones of privacy" do exist under the Constitution).
136. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
137. Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 3, 2010,
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWSO9/l 1030390/-
1/NE WS04/Iowans-dismiss-three-justices.
138. Lynda Waddington, GOP House Members Seek Impeachment oflowa Justices for
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Objections to such constitutional decisions as those of the
California and Iowa courts are often stated as protests against
"activism."' In defense of state courts rendering such decisions, it
might be said that the role model of the Supreme Court of the United
States in recent times makes such state court decisions merely
adherent to the federal standard for social change by judicial decree.
E. Tort Reform
The money spent on state judicial campaigns such as those
resulting in the non-retention of Chief Justice Bird or Justice Russell
Nigro was not necessarily, or even likely, spent as an expression of the
donors' interest in the issues of capital punishment or a pay raise.
Some and perhaps much of the funding of judicial campaigns almost
surely comes from groups having a stake in the law of torts that is
made and enforced in state courts. The Rose Bird court, like its
predecessors, could be seen as sympathetic to the needs of injured
citizens for compensation. As a result of such perceptions, elected
state judiciaries became "a political football" 40 in numerous states. 14 1
Beginning in the 1980s, contests in funding judicial elections
between tort lawyers and defense interests became highly visible in
several states. Most notable at first were Texas 42 and Alabama.'4 3
Much of the money for contested judicial campaigns came from
lawyers and litigants who expected to appear in court. A notable
Same-Sex Marriage Decision, IOWA INDEP. (Apr. 22, 2011, 8:22 AM), http://
iowaindependent.com/55122/gop-house-members-seek-impeachment-of-iowa-justices-for-
same-sex-marriage-decision?utm campaign=twitter&utm medium=twitter&utmsource=
twitter.
139. See Mallory Simon, Iowa Voters Oust Justices Who Made Same-Sex Marriage
Legal, CNN.COM (Nov. 3,2010, 1:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/1 1/03
/iowa.judges/index.html?iref=storysearch.
140. Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Accountability to the Past, Present and Future:
Precedent, Politics andPower, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19,28-29 (2005).
141. For empirical support, see generally Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich,
Jr., Voter Knowledge, Behavior, and Attitudes in Primary and General Judicial Elections,
82 JUDICATURE 216 (1999) (analyzing voter knowledge, behavior, and attitudes in
Washington state judicial elections); Elenore Cotter Klingler, Poll Finds Voters
Uninformed About Judicial Selection, LITIG. NEWS, ABA (Dec. 15,2008), http://apps
.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/voters-judicial-elections.html. For
more general information, see generally CHARLES G. GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND
CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(2008) (discussing the dynamic equilibrium between Congress and the independent
judiciary).
142. Timothy Howell, So Long "Sweetheart" -State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Gandy Swings the Pendulum Further to the Right as the Latest in a Line of Setbacks for
Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST. MARY's L.J. 47, 52-56 (1997).
143. Gregory Jaynes, Where the TortsBlossom, TIME, Mar. 20, 1995, at 38.
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example was provided in the case of Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc.,14 in
which plaintiffs counsel made a $10,000 contribution to the judge's
campaign fund at the very moment of filing the case with the court's
clerk. 145
In 1988, the United States Chamber of Commerce established its
Institute for Legal Reform and began to invest many millions of
dollars each biennium to secure the election of state court judges who
favor and are likely to advance the cause of "tort reform." 46 The
Chamber was not alone. In Texas, for example, the state medical
association invested significant resources and efforts to secure
election of judges sympathetic to their concerns about malpractice
liability. 147 Funding by such organizations is not technically
objectionable as corrupt because those organizations providing the
funds almost never litigate and cannot be accused of seeking favor for
themselves.148 But the funding groups are often associations of future
litigants who are obviously buying future favor for their members,
partly by electing judges' who share political aims favoring tort
reform or the social values of their fund-providers, or perhaps also
seeking to intimidate high court judges deciding cases that might
present new issues of interest to their members who might in the
future seek retention or re-election. And many who seek to influence
judicial elections may have no interest in the professional
qualifications of the candidates they support.149
In addition to its heavy spending, the Chamber's Institute has
been responsible for some of the ugliest judicial campaigns. In the
2000 Ohio campaign, its local group established and funded Citizens
for a Strong Ohios 0 that ran attack ads against Justice Alice Resnick,
144. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
145. THOMAS PETZINGER JR., OIL & HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS 282,
288-90 (1987).
146. David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial
Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Campaign Finance Laws and the First Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2003);
Emily Gottlieb, Chamber of Horrors: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Leads the
Campaign to Eviscerate Victims'Right to Sue, MULTINAT'L MONITOR, March-April 2005,
at 10, 10.
147. CHEEK & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 101, at 42-50; Ken Ortolon, The Big 4-0:
TEXPAC Celebrates a Milestone Anniversary, TEX. MED., May 2002, at 45,47-48.
148. Such is an accusation that cannot be denied in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,
Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). See supra text
accompanying notes 90-93.
149. See RICHARD DAVID, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION PROCESS 103 (2005); Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial
Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1391, 1402 (2001).
150. The group's website was Citizens for a Strong Ohio, http://www.ohiochamber.com
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who was seeking re-election.' Among its commercials was one
showing a female judge switching her vote after someone dropped a
bag of money on her desk, with a voice calling attention to the trial
lawyers' contributions to her campaign.15 2 The Institute also arranged
for the Michigan Chamber of Commerce to run ads in Ohio inviting
businesses to relocate in Michigan in order to secure the services of its
courts said to be more congenial to business interests than those in
Ohio.'
Justice Resnick was nevertheless re-elected, and the Ohio
Elections Commission imposed a modest penalty on the Institute for
its misdeed.'5 4 The Institute's approach was replicated elsewhere in
2004, but with somewhat greater restraint. It ranked states whose
"legal environments" were less forgiving of business practices, and
then ran campaign commercials publicizing its negative assessments
of Illinois, West Virginia, and Mississippi.' 5 This sort of
communication might be identified as "voter education" within the
meaning of the 2001 Internal Revenue Code so that firms
contributing to its preparation and distribution are entitled to deduct
the cost from taxable income.' In Mississippi, the 2004 distribution
of this voter education was followed by a million dollar campaign (a
sum previously unheard of in Mississippi) that succeeded in unseating
Justice Charles McRae.'" In Illinois, the members of the Chamber
contributed more than $2 million to the campaign of Lloyd Karmeier
(who refused to recuse himself from the Avery appeal, despite
receiving contributions from the defendants' employees) for a seat on
the state supreme court;' the contributions were made through a
/Citizens/about.asp. Unsurprisingly, it seems to have disappeared.
151. Gottlieb, supra note 146, at 10.
152. John Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental
Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 299 (2001).
153. Id.
154. Steve Hoffman, Sleaze-Free Ohio Races Next Year? Good Luck. The Anonymous
Now Can Attack at Will, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 29, 2007, at A 14.
155. Seegenerally U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RANKING THE STATES
LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2010: STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS SURVEY (2010) available athttp://
www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2010LawsuitClimateReport.pdf (reviewing
the rankings, perceptions, and concerns of court liability systems in 2010).
156. See Emily's List v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 581 F.3d 1, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 26
U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 501(c)(6), 527 (2011). SeegenerallyBRUCE P. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2011) (discussing current regulations regarding tax-
exempt organizations).
157. Robert Lenzner & Matthew Miller, Buying Justice, FORBES, July 21, 2003, at 64,
64. This event appears to have inspired a novel of JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008).
158. See Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The BestDefense: Why
Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 510-11 (2006).
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group called the American Taxpayers Alliance, an organization
known only to its funding sources.159
The Chamber's Institute claimed to have won every race that it
tried to influence in 2004, but this cannot be confirmed because the
Institute was not required in most states to make the necessary
disclosures, and the money must generally pass through multiple
hands. A similar level of expenditure on judicial campaigns was
achieved by the Institute in subsequent elections, but with less visible
results. 160
F. The Price ofludicial Candidacies
As a result of these developments, it came to be that, even in a
state of average size such as Alabama, a campaign for a six-year term
on the supreme court could cost a candidate and his or her supporters
millions of dollars.'6' And the price is similar or higher in Texas,
California, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 62 Indeed, by 2000, candidates for
seats on highest state courts sometimes appear to have spent more on
their campaigns than did candidates for the United States Senate
running for office on the same ballot.163 And the price has not visibly
declined.
G. The Impediment to Court Reform
The furors over capital punishment, the design of election
districts, abortion, gun control, tort reform, and gay marriage have
had the additional secondary effect of elevating the resistance of
many voters to any reform that makes judges less accountable to the
electorate for decisions having such moral and political content and
consequences.'"
159. See Pub. Citizen, Overview: American Taxpayers Alliance, PUBLIC CITIZEN: THE
NEW STEALTH PACS, http://www.stealthpacs.org/profile.cfm?org id=106 (last visited
Aug. 25, 2011).
160. Pub. Citizen, Overview: US Chamber of Commerce, PUBLIC CITIZEN: THE NEW
STEALTH PACS, http://www.stealthpacs.org/profile.cfm?orgid=43 (last visited Aug. 25,
2011).
161. Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 68, 70.
162. See id. at 68-70,72.
163. See Matthew J. Streb, Judicial Elections and Public Perception of the Courts, in
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC 147,
151 (Bruce Peabody ed., 2011).
164. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS: HOW THE
CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA 198-200 (2005) (describing how
Conservatives influenced the abortion debate); KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN
THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED
MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 237-50 (2006) (discussing the controversial topics that
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In 1987, in light of the then current developments, a major effort
was made to amend the Ohio Constitution to provide for merit
selection.' 5 The reform was widely supported by political parties and
organizations as well as the organized bar, but was soundly rejected
by the electorate.'6 6 Opponents of such revivals of the twentieth
century Progressive reform movement explained that the merit
selection proposal "assume[s] that the voting public is incapable of
selecting qualified judges .... This is a dangerous and undemocratic
premise that would place the selection of judges in the hands of a
privileged few."' An extreme example of this widely shared attitude
was the proposed amendment to the South Dakota Constitution
limiting judicial immunity to expose judges to civil and criminal
liability for certain unpopular decisions.' The state's voters rejected
that extreme proposal in November 2006,169 but its proponents hold
similar ambitions in other states.' 70
In 1997, the American Bar Association conducted a national
conference to address these issues.' 7 ' No clear solutions emerged from
that discussion, but other academic discussions would ensue. 7 2 In
have influenced politics).
165. For an account of this effort, see John Felice, John Kilwein & Eliot Slotnick,
Judicial Reform in Ohio, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 51, 51 (Anthony
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
166. Id. at 51-52.
167. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 307 (2002)
(quoting Lawrence Landskroner, An Unmeritorious Way to Select Judges, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), Jan. 29, 1994, at 7B); see also Seth Anderson, Judicial Election Against
Merit Selection: Examining the Decline in Support for Merit Selection m the States, 67 A LB.
L. REv. 793, 794-95 (2004) (discussing reasons for the declining support of merit selection
proposals).
168. See Richard Acello, South Dakota to Vote on Putting Judges on Trial, 5 A.B.A. J.
EREPORT 2 (Jan. 18, 2006, 2:48PM), http://www.cobar.org/docs/ABA% 20Journal.pdfID=
20813.
169. Matt Apuzzo, Fight Against 'Judicial Activism' to Continue Despite Election
Setbacks, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-l1
-11-judicial-critics x.htm.
170. On similar initiatives in Florida, see David Nitkin, Christian Right Seeks Triple
Crown: With the Legislature Won and the Governorship Within Reach, the Coalition Sets
Sights on Judiciary, SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 19, 1998, at Al; David Nitkin, Religious Right:
Rein in Judges, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 1998, at Cl. For initiatives in California, see
Gail Diane Cox, Ouster of Two Calif Justices Sought, NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1998, at A8.
171. The papers were published as Symposium, JudicialIndependence and Democratic
Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 1.
172. See generally, e.g., William V. Dorsaneo, III, Opening Comment to the March
1999 Roy R. Ray Lecture, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 53 SMU L. Rev. 255 (2000) (introducing the issues of partisan
election process for Texas Supreme Court candidates and current campaign finance
1997
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2000, the Century Foundation's Constitution Project published a
report addressing the issues; it favored the Missouri Plan, but also
emphasized the need for longer terms that would at least diminish the
stress and cost of frequent elections, and it acknowledged the growing
perils of retention elections."' Also in 2000, the National Center for
State Courts conducted a National Summit conference on the subject
of judicial selection." 4 And the Conference of Chief Justices then
joined the call for reform."' In 2002, the American Bar Association
partially conceded a point when it acknowledged the possibility of
public financing of elections as an alternative less attractive than
"merit selection," but as a viable alternative.' In 2005, the American
Bar Association amended its guidelines for the evaluation ofjudges in
the hope that voters mindful of its guidelines would resist the urge to
vote ideologically on the basis of the outcome in a celebrated case.
Several states now employ systems of evaluation, and the North
Carolina Bar has a project underway to provide judicial evaluations
that will become a part of an official voters' guide."17
practices); Bradley A. Smith, Symposium on Judicial Elections: Selecting Judges in the 21st
Century, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 437 (2002) (discussing the challenges of judicial election
processes); Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311
(1999) (examining the threats to judicial independence and the available means of
ensuring judicial accountability); Symposium, Selecting Judges in Pennsylvania, 106 DICK.
L. REV. 679 (2002) (presenting a variety of perspectives on judicial election processes);
Others are noted in Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study ofJudicial
Selection in New York City, 1977-2002,37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 792-94 (2004).
173. See CHOOSING JUSTICE: REFORMING THE SELECTION OF STATE JUDGES: THE
REPORT OF THE CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS TASK FORCE ON SELECTING
STATE COURT JUDGES, in UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICAN COURTS 77,
90-91 (The Century Foundation Press ed., 2000).
174. Its conclusions were stated in Call to Action, Statement ofthe National Summit on
Impro ving Judicial Selection, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1353, 1355-59 (2001).
175. Tony Mauro, Justices Urge Overhaul ofJudicialRaces, RECORDER, Jan. 26, 2001,
at 1.
176. COMM'N ON PUB. FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, AM. BAR ASS'N
STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGNS 40-43 (2002), available athttp://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/migrated/judind/pdf/commissionreport4_03.authcheckdam.pdf.
177. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION
OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 3-4 (2005), available athttp://www.abanet.org/jd
/lawyersconf/pdf/jpec final.pdf (asking voters, in Guidelines 5-2-5 to 5-2-7, to be
influenced by the ability of a judge to consider both sides, to decide without regard for the
identity of the parties, and to make difficult or unpopular decisions). On the origins of the
reform, see Kevin M. Esterling, Judicial Accountability the Right Way Offfcial
Performance Evaluations Help the Electorate as Well as the Bench, 82 JUDICATURE 206,
206-07 (1999); Leonard Post, ABA Offers New Way to Judge the Judges, NAT'L L.J., May
2, 2005, at 4.
178. Russell Rawlings, Judicial Performance Evaluation Report Issued, N.C. BAR
ASS'N (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.ncbar.org/about/communications/news/2008-news-
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The effect of these efforts remains uncertain. But the judicial
elections of 2008 provided a cheerful moment for those attentive to
the concern that money was being used to buy the judiciaries of many
states. Underfunded judicial candidates in Michigan and West
Virginia gained seats on their highest state courts despite large
investments in their rivals' campaigns by business interests. And there
was some evidence that this result was a reaction of voters against the
efforts of Chambers of Commerce to buy favorable election results.' 9
The Chamber may have lightened up in 2010. There seem to have
been no momentous contests that year.
These events in other states were in due course noticed in North
Carolina. In 1989, a Judicial Selection Study Commission appointed
by the North Carolina Governor recommended replacing the system
of electing judges with a gubernatorial appointment system with
retention elections.8 o The proposal, coming not long after the
resounding defeat of the idea in Ohio, was approved by the State
Senate but was never acted on by the House."' By that time, it was
evident that the financing of judicial campaigns was a growing threat
to the respect of North Carolinians for their state's judiciary, even
though big money campaigns had not yet been experienced in their
state.'82 In 1986, an average of $73,600 was spent on each seat of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina that was up for election. By 1994,
the average was $300,000,183 and the price continued to rise, although
not to levels experienced in many other states. At that time, the
Supreme Court of the United States had not yet extended the First
Amendment to invalidate laws applicable to judicial election
campaigning, but that prospect was clearly seen on the horizon in the
light of other decisions bearing on the right to spend money to
influence elections. But no action was then taken to avoid pending
doom.
In 1994, Chief Justice James Exum appointed an array of
eminent citizens to a Commission for the Future of Justice and the
articles/judicial-performance-evaluation-report-issued.aspx.
179. Amanda Bronstad, Business Connections Hurt Judicial Incumbents, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 10, 2008, at 6.
180. JUDICIAL SELECTION STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, CHIEF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE 1989 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH
CAROLINA 12 (1989).
181. S.B. 218, 1989-1990 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1989); S.B. 219, 1989-1990
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1989).
182. Robert Morgan, Let's Reform the Judicial Election Process Now, N.C. LAW., Jan.-
Feb. 2001, at 14.
183. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 167, at 278.
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Courts in North Carolina. Its report, published in 1996, proposed a
"merit selection" scheme resembling the Missouri plan.184 The stated
aim was to insulate the judiciary from partisan politics. That proposal,
like others advanced by the Commission for enhancement of the state
court system, gained little support in the state legislature and was not
seriously considered,' perhaps partly in recognition of the
considerations causing the similar proposal to fail in Ohio.
In 2001, a North Carolina Committee on Judicial Elections
appointed itself to develop a more marketable proposal.'86 The
Committee sought a method of facilitating low-budget campaigns for
judicial office and a means of deterring the high-cost methods
employed with increasing frequency in other states. Although fully
sensitive to the considerations that had led the North Carolina Bar
Association to support the Missouri Plan, it recommended the
establishment of a publicly-funded voter's guide of the sort in use in
some other states' that would contain information about every
candidate for judicial office who agreed to accept constraints on high-
cost campaigns.' It was proposed that the guide be distributed by
mail to every registered voter in the state and would be posted on a
publicized website. The committee's recommendations were, like
those of the previous commission's, not seriously considered by the
state's legislature.
While this self-appointed committee proposal also failed to gain
traction, its proposal did resonate with another under consideration
184. COMM'N FOR THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS IN N.C., FINAL
REPORT (1996). For comment, see generally Samuel Latham Grimes, Without Favor,
Denial or Delay: Will North Carolina Finally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 2266 (1998).
185. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Bruce W. Hardy, Will Ignorance & Partisan
Election of Judges Undermine Public Trust in the Judiciary?, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 11,
12-13; Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1445-47 (2003).
186. Its members included eight former members of the state's appellate courts (one of
whom has since been appointed to the United States Court of Appeals), a former
Governor, a former United States Senator, a former president of the American Bar
Association, two former university presidents, and three former law school deans. See
N.C. COMM. ON JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A
VOTER'S GUIDE FOR USE FOR CANDIDATES FOR STATEWIDE JUDICIAL OFFICES IN
NORTH CAROLINA (2001) (on file with author).
187. Id. Such guides have been used in other states beginning in Washington in 1996.
See2006Judicial VoterPamphleA WASHINGTON COURTS, available athttp://www.courts
.wa.gov/voters/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
188. See generally N.C. COMM. ON JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, supra note 186
(proposing that North Carolina publish a voter guide to avoid undue influence, or the
appearance of such, from campaigns).
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by the legislature. The other proposal was for public financing of
legislative campaigns that was modeled on laws then recently enacted
in Arizona, Maine, and Vermont. The legislature was willing to
consider the proposal because it was sponsored by a group of
organizations having significant political clout, such as the American
Association of Retired Persons and the North Carolina Academy of
Trial Lawyers. Two other groups assembled that group of influential
organizations: Democracy North Carolina and the North Carolina
Center for Voter Education. Their cry was for "voter-owned"
elections.'89
The timing of these two proposals facilitated a compromise of
sorts in the North Carolina legislature when it enacted a law
providing for public funding of judicial campaigns. That reform was
less than the advocates for voter-owned elections sought, and was not
what either the Commissions, the Committee, or the voluntary North
Carolina Bar Association had advocated to shield the state's judiciary
from the worst features of privately financed campaigns. However, it
was better for both initiatives than outright rejection would have
been. The Governor signed the Judicial Campaign Reform Act on
October 10, 2002.190
The Act first directed the State Board of Elections to publish a
voters' guide providing information about the candidates.1 91 The
legislation failed to appropriate sufficient funds for that purpose. A
guide was nevertheless published for the 2004 election, 9 2 with help
from several non-profit organizations, private foundations, and
federal funds for voter education. It was distributed to every
189. See generally Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160
(1994) (arguing that public financing of campaigns for public office is inconsistent with
American democracy). For earlier considerations of this idea, see generally Joel L.
Fleishman, Public Financing of Election Campaigns: Constitutional Constraints on Steps
Toward Equality ofPolitical Influence of Citizens, 52 N.C. L. REV. 349 (1973) (examining
and comparing the litigative and legislative models of legal change in the context of public
financing of election campaigns); Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Campaign Financing and
Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1974) (applying equal protection analysis in
the context of the electoral process to the inequalities created by the campaign funding
practice).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2009).
191. § 163-278.69(a).
192. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2004 JUDICIAL VOTER GUIDE: A GUIDE TO VOTING
AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA (2004), available athttp://www.ncjudges
.org/downloads/voterguide_04.pdf; see also Study: N.C. Judicial Voter Guide a Success,
NCJUDGES.ORG (FEB. 16,2005), http://www.ncjudges.org/media/news-releases/2_16_05
.html (describing voters' approval of the new voter guides).
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household at a cost of approximately $500,000. A subsequent poll
revealed that the voters favorably received it.193
That Act also created a form of semi-non-partisan runoff
election to be held following partisan primaries.'94 This reform led the
Republican Party to circulate a voters' guide identifying its
candidates. The wisdom of the non-partisan judicial election has been
questioned by the recent work of Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda
Gann Hall, whose data indicate that voters are better informed about
candidates in partisan judicial elections than in non-partisan ones.19s
But no substantial protest was raised against this mixing of partisan
and non-partisan politics.
Of greatest interest to those in other states, the Act created a
Public Fund for use in the 2004 and subsequent elections for the
purpose of deterring large campaign contributions. 96 Candidates who
raised a threshold amount of money and who agreed to strict
spending and fundraising limits are entitled to receive a lump sum of
public funding to run their campaign.'1 The law also provides for
rescue money in the event that a publicly financed candidate is
outspent by a privately financed opponent.'" To gain this public
subvention, judicial candidates had to first raise $35,000 from at least
350 voters, with no contribution greater than $500.'99
The Public Fund was barely sufficient to meet the needs for the
2004 election. In response, legislation in 2005 added an important new
source of money for the Public Fund, a surcharge of fifty dollars on
annual state bar dues. 200 The private North Carolina Bar Association
protested this funding technique, but the money lawyers or lawyer
organizations paid in the form of voluntary campaign contributions to
193. Study: N.C. Judicial Voter Guide a Success, supra note 192 (discussing the poll that
was conducted for the Center for Voter Education by American Viewpoint of Alexandria,
Virginia).
194. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 7(a), 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 626 (amending N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-329). On the issue of partisan selection of judicial candidates, see
Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's Perspecive, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 17-18 (2003); Ryan L. Souders, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: Partisan
Judicial Elections in the United States, 25 REv. LITIG. 529, 548-55 (2006).
195. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 109 (2009).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.63(a) (2009).
197. § 163-278.64(d) (describing the restrictions on contributions and expenditures for
certified candidates).
198. Act of Oct. 10, 2002, ch. 158, § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 620 (amending N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67(a)).
199. § 1, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 618 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.64).
200. Act of Aug. 13, 2005, ch. 276, §23A.1(a), 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 668, 959
(amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-34).
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appellate-level judicial candidates dropped from $744,000 in 2002 to
$302,000 in 2004.201 The $442,000 saved did not equal the proceeds
from the $50 tax imposed after that election, but it did make a dent.
The other wrinkle in the scheme was a provision allowing state
income taxpayers a choice in the amount of three dollars.202 If they
check the right box on the state tax form, three dollars goes to the
Public Fund, but if they do not check the box, the three dollars goes
into the General Fund with their other tax dollars. This choice posed
a public relations challenge for those favoring the program. Many
taxpayers do not see the box at all, or assume that if they check it,
their taxes will increase by three dollars. As such, this forced
supporters of public funding to remind their acquaintances to check
the box, and that it would cost them nothing to do so.
Despite its flaws and limitations, the scheme was pronounced
"the nation's number-one model for reform" by the executive
director of the Justice at Stake Campaign, a Washington-based group
that monitors judicial elections across America.20 3 It was replicated in
New Mexico,2" Wisconsin,2 05 and West Virginia.2 06
Alas, the Supreme Court of the United States in 2011 held that
the matching funds feature of the scheme was a violation of the First
201. DEMOCRACY N.C., A PROFILE OF THE JUDICIAL PUBLIC FINANCING PROGRAM,
2004-2006, at 3 (2006), available athttp://www.nc-democracy.org/downloads
/JudicialVOEImpactO6-06.pdf.
202. § 4,2002 N.C. Sess. Laws at 625 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159.2).
203. N.C. Bucks Trend of Nasty Judicial Elections, NCJUDGES.ORG (Nov. 11, 2004),
http://www.ncjudges.org/media/news releases/i 1_11 04.html (internal quotations
omitted); see also Press Release, Justice at Stake, 2004 State Supreme Court Elections
Driven by Record TV Ad Spending (Jun. 27, 2005), available athttp://www.justiceatstake
.org/newsroom/pressreleases.cfm/2004_state supreme court elections driven by record
tvadspending?show=news&newslD=6126 (describing the growing use of advertising in
judicial elections).
204. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 195, at 122-24.
205. Act of Dec. 1, 2009, ch. 89, 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws, 1020, 1020-27; see Press Release,
Justice at Stake, 'Big Victory' in Wisconsin (Nov. 5, 2009), available athttp://www
justiceatstake.org/newsroom/featured stories.cfm/justice atstakehails_public financing
breakthroughin wisconsin?show=news&newslD=6241. It was promptly challenged by
Wisconsin Right to Life for its "chilling effect" on its right to influence elections with
campaign contributions. Warren Richey, Wisconsin Lawsuit Tests a Pioneering Campaign
Finance Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA
/Justice/2009/12 19/Wisconsin-lawsuit-tests-a-pioneering-campaign-finance-law.
206. Act of Mar. 13, 2010, ch. 72, 2010 W. Va. Acts 863, 863-96; see Press Release,
Justice at Stake, Justice at Stake Hails Public-Financing Vote in West Virginia (Mar. 12,
2010), available athttp://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press releases.cfm/justice_at
_stake hails-publicfinancingvote_inwest virginia?show=news&newslD=7006; see
also Editorial, From Scandal to Example, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at A24 (describing
the pilot program for voluntary public financing in Supreme Court elections).
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Amendment rights of citizens or corporations to express thoughts
about a judicial election by spending on a scale that overwhelms the
standard fund normally provided to the candidate who accepts the
support of the public fund.207
VI. EXPERIENCE WITH THE 2002 NORTH CAROLINA ACT: ITS
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
While three other states have now followed its lead in the public
funding reform, North Carolina has continued to struggle with the
issues. Its experience may be informative not only to those states that
have replicated the public funding law, but also to those numerous
other states in need of reforms to resolve the crises imposed on them
by the decisions of the Supreme Court.
In 2003, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, invoking
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,208 without prior notice or
hearings, announced an amendment to its canons governing judicial
campaigning to affirm that "[a] judge may engage in political activity
consistent with the judge's status as a public official."209 Thus, public
finance did not fully resolve the problem of campaign promises, nor
address the problem of defamatory campaigning.
In 2004, there were two contested seats on the state's supreme
court, and three on the intermediate court of appeals. There were
sixteen candidates for the five offices. Twelve qualified for public
funding. Four of the five who won offices qualified for, and received,
public funding. Court of appeals candidates received $137,500 and
were permitted to raise an additional $66,000. Supreme court
candidates received as much as $201,775 and were permitted to raise
an additional $69,180.210 Apparently, no rescue funds were needed or
sought in 2004.
It thus remained that no candidate seeking a judicial office in
North Carolina engaged in big spending of the sort experienced in
many other states. Chris Heagerty, the Executive Director of the
Center for Voter Education explained that "[b]ecause the new law
gave our candidates the ability to respond to special interest attacks,
207. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813
(2011).
208. 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002).
209. See Supreme Court of N.C., Order Adopting Amendments to the N.C. Code of
Judicial Content, at Canon 7 (Jan. 31, 2006), availableathttp://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www
/public/aoc/Amendments-NCJudicialCode.pdf.
210. See Gary L. Wright, Soliciting Taken Out of Judicial Races, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Oct. 3, 2004, at IP.
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from the political left or right, I think many groups stayed out of
North Carolina because they knew that our candidates now had the
resources to fight back and set the record straight."211
Barbara Jackson won a seat on the court of appeals in 2004. She
had failed to qualify for public funding, and, in 2006, brought an
action in the federal court seeking a declaration that the scheme is
unconstitutional. 212 Jackson argued that it was a violation of the First
Amendment for the state to provide public funds to a rival candidate.
The North Carolina Bar Association (a voluntary organization) also
appeared to challenge the fifty-dollar tariff on lawyers as an unjust
discrimination. The Brennan Institute at the New York University
Law School undertook to represent the state in defending the
program and acquired the services of former Chief Justice Exum for
that purpose. The district court dismissed, the court of appeals
affirmed,2 13 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.214 But, in 2011,
it would reverse its position on the matching funds issue.
In addition to now-Justice Jackson, some lawyers aggrieved to
pay fifty dollars were not happy with the 2002 legislation. As soon as
the 2004 election was held, the North Carolina Bar Association
resolved to deal with the problem with a new initiative. A committee
was appointed to study the matter and make a different proposal. Its
specific proposal to the 2005 legislature was a constitutional
amendment providing for gubernatorial appointments, an early
confirmation election in which no rival candidacy would be presented,
and thereafter longer terms than the present eight years.215 At least
some of its lobbying effort was invested in an unsuccessful protest
against the fifty-dollar contribution. Its proposal was at least for the
moment resisted by the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers
(now the North Carolina Advocates for Justice), whose members
were prone to mistrust the proposal as elitist in its aims. No action
was taken by the legislature on the Bar's proposal.
211. N.C. Bucks Trend ofNasty Judicial Elections, supra note 203.
212. Press Release, Democracy N.C., Lawsuit Challenges Judicial Public Financing
Program, availableathttp://www.democracy-nc.org/reports/researchreports
/LawsuitChallenges.pdf.
213. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2008). This
was not the first conflict between that group and North Carolina election laws. In 1999, the
court of appeals had partially affirmed a district court decision invalidating an earlier state
law regulating campaign funding. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 708 (4th
Cir. 1999).
214. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008).
215. S.B. 523, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
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In June 2006, because Justice Sarah Parker's rival in the
campaign for the office of chief justice spent more than allowed by
the scheme, Parker was permitted to draw from the Public Fund an
additional rescue grant enabling her more nearly to match his
expenditures. Even though she was still outspent, she won the
election.2 16 Also, in 2006, for the first time a substantial sum was spent
by an independent group advocating the election of some of the
candidates. 2 17 Members of the trial lawyers' organization expended
this money in the last weeks of the campaign. The Board of Elections
was asked to provide rescue funds for those candidates who were
disfavored by the 527 interjection, but concluded that it was not
authorized to do so. 2 18 Others feared that this unexpected special
funding by a group of trial lawyers would evoke a massive response
by the Chamber of Commerce in later elections, but this did not
happen in 2008 or 2010.219
Despite its moderate success, there are continuing frailties in the
scheme enacted in 2002. One is the delicate sufficiency of the Public
Fund. In 2006, the legislature did approve a one-time only
contribution from the current excess revenue of $750,000 to shore up
the Fund against possible needs to make rescue payments. 2 20 It also
modified the taxpayer check off to make it less dependent on the
taxpayer's momentary understanding of the consequences of the
contribution. The funds provided were apparently adequate for the
needs of 2008 and 20 10.221
A second enduring frailty is the Official Voters' Guide
("Guide"). Although well-received by voters, it is not as informative
as it could be. The Guide could provide the voters with the important
excerpts from the American Bar Association guidelines promulgated
in 2005222 to counsel against simplistic ideological voting. And in
216. Gary D. Robertson, Campagn Funds Stir up Debate, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 21, 2006, at 5B.
217. Andrea Weigl, TV Ads Highight 4 Candidates: Some Question Legality of
Contributions to FairJudges.ne4 NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2006, at 5B.
218. See Editorial, JudicialAd Trips Alarm, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 2,
2006, at Al0 ("Both [candidates] quickly petitioned the State Board of Elections for
'rescue funds,' released to candidates whose opponents exceed spending limits. They were
denied because the ads weren't run by their opponents but by a group known as a '527' for
the Internal Revenue Service rule governing it.").
219. See N.C. Public Funding Programs: 2010 Candidates, N.C. STATE BD. OF
ELECTIONS, http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/content.aspx?id=21 (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
220. Lynn Bonner, House Backs Election Funding: Some Campaigns Could Get State
Aid, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 29, 2007, at IB.
221. No requests for matching funds are recorded.
222. See generally BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL
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accord with recommendations of a subcommittee of the North
Carolina Bar Association, it could also be more useful and more
effective if it was enlarged to incorporate endorsements by pre-
existing organizations (including the political parties) that agreed to
refrain from spending on judicial campaigns. A website could then be
supplied to which every contribution would be reported
instantaneously. That would provide an additional disincentive to
spend large sums calling for matching funds.
Also, the public funding program could be strengthened further
if only candidates agreeing to the campaign finance rules were
permitted to make brief campaign statements in the Guide. If
organizations endorsing candidates could be permitted to make brief
statements explaining their endorsement provided that they limit
other forms of communicating with voters and make an appropriate
contribution to the Public Fund. This last suggestion is not without
risk; some organizations could give reasons so inappropriate as to
diminish the utility of the Guide to produce an informed electorate.223
In response to these weaknesses, the North Carolina Bar
Association is now conducting a program to formally evaluate its
judges. The American Bar Association recommended such a program
in 2005.224 Some states use the American Bar Association standards to
guide a formal evaluation process that produces a report, which can
be made available in a voters' guide when a sitting judge stands for
retention. The institution performing the evaluation is generally the
same as that responsible for the discipline of miscreant judges. As the
case of Penny White in Tennessee exemplified, a favorable report
does not assure retention even when there is no rival.2 25 But a
program of this sort will add weight to the Guide. Experience in the
State of Washington tends to confirm that many voters take such
reports seriously and that they tend to strengthen judicial
PERFORMANCE, supra note 177 (recommending guidelines for judicial evaluation
programs).
223. For example, Oklahomans for Judicial Excellence was a business organization in
disguise. Chuck Ervin, Oklahoma Judges Rated by Coalition, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 5,
1998, at Bl.
224. See generally BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE, supra note 177 (recommending guidelines for judicial evaluation
programs).
225. For the current report, see TENN. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
COMM'N, TENNESSEE APPELLATE JUDGES EVALUATION REPORT (2010), available at
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/jpec-evaluations_2010.pdf. See generally
Susan Keilitz & Judith W. McBride, Judicial Performance Evaluation Comes of Age, 16
STATE CT. J. 4 (1992) (comparing various evaluation methods and noting the benefits of
each).
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independence. 2 26 Those who participate in judicial evaluations in the
State of Washington are not only the lawyers, but also the witnesses
and jurors who have appeared in the incumbent's court. For appellate
judges, only appellate advocates are enlisted as evaluators. The usual
problems associated with efforts to quantify the ineffable persist; no
one engaged in the process can be confident in their own judgment,
based as it is on narrowly limited experience. To some extent,
receiving written comments can diminish that problem, but if
circulated to voters, these may be likely to weigh too heavily. With
respect to appellate courts, 27 the crudely quantified appraisals of
lawyers over time and across cases, when compared to responses of
lawyers to other judges, would seem to have some value. Shared with
voters, they could provide a more rational basis for choice than much
of the other information shared in a voters' guide of the sort
distributed in 2004-2010, and would have the effect of reducing the
ability of partisan voter guides to compete with the disinterested
Guide.
That feature in the existing scheme evokes comparison with a
scheme proposed by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres that would give
each voter a fund of fifty "patriot dollars" to distribute to any
candidate they might choose.228 They proposed that this could be
done with a private visit to an ATM machine, where all contributions
would be made, so that the candidate would not know the source of
the contributions. 229 The hope would be that secret contributions like
secret votes would immunize both candidates and voters against any
sense of obligation or entitlement derived from their contributions.
Their stated aim was to disrupt the market for political influence.230
While their scheme has theoretical attraction, its practical
implications and consequences are complex and difficult to foretell. 231
Its authors rest their advocacy in part on the futility they perceive in
226. David C. Brody, The Relationship between Judicial Performance Evaluations and
JudicialElections, 87 JUDICATURE 168, 170,177 (2004).
227. On the difficulties with publicizing results for trial judges, see Marilyn Cavicchia,
JudicialEvaluations: Hennepin County, Minnesota, JUDGES' J., winter 2005, at 41,43.
228. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 4, 66-67 (2002).
229. Id. at 66-68.
230. Id. at 69.
231. See Lillian R. BeVier, What Ails Us, 112 YALE L.J. 1135, 1137 (2003) (reviewing
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 228). For an array of other comments on their book,
see Kathryn Abrams, Commentaries.: Hybridizing Citizenship, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 935,
935-1184 (2003) (reviewing ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 228).
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efforts to reconstruct the present regime in light of what the Supreme
Court of the United States has done with the First Amendment.2 32
Another useful, but modest, reform in the present system of
judicial selection in North Carolina is the "instant runoff."233 A law
enacted in 2005 authorized its use in elections to fill vacancies. 234 In
2008, its use was extended to apply to all local elections. 235 It allows
voters to express a second choice in the general election should their
first choice fail to win, thus eliminating the need for a runoff and
sparing the candidates some additional expense.
Despite the persistence in efforts to reform a system of selecting
judges that is faithful to the Lincolnesque aim embodied in the 1868
North Carolina constitution, the North Carolina Bar Association
proposal may be the nearest thing to an acceptable constitutional
compromise with the Supreme Court's activist political vision.
The Bar's present proposal was crafted by a committee led by
former Chief Justice Exum and former Bar president John Wester,
and has been introduced as Senate Bill 47.236 The sponsors are
Senator Fletcher Hartsell and Assemblyman Dan Clodfelter. It is a
variation on the traditional Missouri Plan resembling plans in place in
other states that have reluctantly surrendered their citizens' right to
elect judges. The critical feature is that it maintains the retention of
election and so assures a measure of accountability to deter excesses
of judicial activism. The bill would create a statewide Judicial
Nominating Commission whose twelve members would be selected in
diverse ways to assure a measure of non-partisan but popular
representation; half would be lawyers. When a vacancy occurs, the
Commission would be responsible for nominating two candidates for
the office. The Governor would be eligible to run for the office. The
Governor would be authorized to choose one of the candidates. If the
other chose not to contest an election, the Governor's choice would
232. Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Response: WhyA NewParadigm?, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1147, 1162-64 (2003).
233. For a succinct statement of the case, see Blair Bober, Voting, as Easy as 1, 2, 3,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/10/opinion/oe-bobierl0.
But see Instant Runoff Voting: Fact vs. Fiction, INSTANTRUNOFFVOTING.U S, http://www
.instantrunoffvoting.us/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2011) (arguing that instant runoff voting is
not "as easy as 1-2-3").
234. SeeRob Richie, Campaign 2006and Bringing Instant Runoff Voting to the Tipping
Point, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.commondreams.org/views06
/1 103-23.htm.
235. Act of Aug. 2, 2008, ch. 150, § 3(a), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 605 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-182.13 (2009)).
236. N.C. BAR ASS'N, PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING How NORTH CAROLINA SELECTS
JUDGES (2011), available atwww.ncbar.org/media/12554545/S47PartisanJudElections.pdf.
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still be required to face a prompt retention election. Once elected, the
judge would serve for eight years and then stand for another
retention election.
The scheme would certainly protect the state from the election of
an unqualified judge of the Donald Yarborough sort. 237 It would
discourage but not prohibit heavy spending on a perhaps bitterly
contested campaign or on a campaign to cause the non-retention of
the sitting judge. One cannot be sure that our activist Supreme Court
will not find a constitutional objection to this design, too, but it is
presently difficult to see what that might be. This author served as a
member of the drafting committee and offers it an unqualified
endorsement. It is, in his view, "worth a damn" and much to be
preferred over the method by which our Supreme Court Justices are
selected. I beg the legislature to enact it.
237. SeeCHEEK& CHAMPAGNE, supra note 101, at 39.
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